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Abstract. Since the 1980s a number of methods and models were de-
veloped to evaluate effects of regulatory interventions in financial
markets. Most of them are based on a simple cost-benefit analysis with
system stability, system efficiency and stakeholder protection as target
function variables. Critical discussions of this models focus on argu-
ments like normative basis, teleological orientation, completeness,
methodological aspects etc. A possible answer to this criticism could be
a score-card oriented approach, including each a system, process, market
and value dimension. Such a model makes it possible to implement
different methods and procedures with both a quantitative and qualitative
analysis focus in an accumulated way.
1. Introduction
Over the recent past, financial industry represen-
tatives have often accused financial market regu-
latory institutions of being far too proactive in
their approach. Terms such as ‘over regulation,’
‘regulatory pressure’ and ‘regulatory burden’ have
been coined on many occasions. The additional
costs that have been created for in particular
smaller institutes by the implementation of addi-
tional regulations has now reached a stage where
it is seriously obstructing the ability of these insti-
tutes to be competitive (BU¨HRER et al., 2005;
HOFFMANN, 2004; GEIGER and HUBLI, 2004).
Yet because neither well-founded analytical con-
cepts nor empirically proven cost-benefit data
exists in most countries for evaluating the con-
sequences of regulation, there is little clarity as to
when one can actually talk about over regulation
and what should actually be subsumed under the
term of regulatory impacts. Because of the desire to
achieve a more objective discussion on this issue,
the regulatory agencies and regulators have been
considering whether or not to subject future regu-
latory measures to a systematic cost and benefit
analysis. Those affected would then be able to
question critically the results of any such analysis
during the consultation process.
The following paper provides a brief overview of
the current situation with regards to the spread of
cost/benefits analyses in several countries, as well
as a critical analysis of the possibilities and limits
provided by such a system for determining the
consequences of state intervention in the financial
markets.
2. Why Regulate?
Regardless of their focus, finance-market-related
regulation theories start from the basis of an
objective function, which derives the efficiency of
the regulation from system stability, system effi-
ciency and customer protection elements. There is
a normative goal that has overriding importance
over the optimization of this objective function.
This goal is based on the assumption and justifica-
tion of a public interest in a functioning financial
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market; although in the discussions surrounding
this issue there is a great deal of difference when it
comes to interpreting what the public interest is
and what it is that makes a financial market
efficient. To this end, then, it would seem to make
a great deal of sense to differentiate between
the normative objective of the regulation, which
sets down the intended goal, the theoretical
justification, which explains why the goals set in
this way can be achieved through regulatory in-
tervention, and an analysis of the motives as to
why and how regulations are actually constructed
in political and economic practice.
Providing an answer to these questions, in turn,
provides the foundations for discussions on the
necessity, intensity and the degree to which regu-
latory intervention actually meets the goals set out.
All state intervention in the competitive workings
of a financial market in the form of regulations
means more costs for those being regulated, which
have to be set against the proposed benefits of the
regulatory measures proposed. Only in instances
where additional regulation actually leads to an
improvement in the efficiency of the existing regu-
latory system can additional regulation be said to
improve system efficiency and with it the stability
of the system and customer protection issues. In the
end, the ability to assess the benefits and costs of
regulatory decisions depends on how their objec-
tives, justifications and motivations are defined.
Unless these parameters are clear it is pointless to
talk about over regulation or gaps in the regulatory
framework.
Once these parameters have been made clear, it
is possible to evaluate and assess the benefits
and costs of an entire regulatory regime or a
certain regulatory decision. And it is set against
this background that a number of methods and
models were developed in a large number of
countries during the 1980s with the aim of
economically evaluating the effects of regulatory
intervention in the financial markets (LAYARD
and GLAISTER, 1994, BRENT, 1996, LEVIN and
MCEWAN, 2001, WILKE-SCHMIDT, 2004).
The most simple regulatory impact analysis
approaches worked by qualitatively recording
and descriptively evaluating the effects. More
sophisticated models in the form of cost/benefit
analyses attempted to evaluate the positive and
negative effects using monetary values and to
calculate a quantifiable net effect of a given
regulatory intervention (or the entire regulatory
framework of a given industry) using a simple
account balancing approach. To this end, the aim
was to record, analyse and evaluate in monetary
terms the possible consequences of proposed
regulations for stakeholders and for the entire
economic system, and to carry out an assessment
based on the actual likelihood of these factors
occurring. The result is a balance value, which
informs ex ante or ex post those responsible for
making the decision about the degree to which a
regulation decision is favourable or not.
Although such consequence assessments remain
controversial in theory and in practice (see
section V below), the European Union took the
decision to introduce a multi-stage regulatory
consequence assessment system starting in 2003,
which was to serve as the core element of a so-
called ‘better regulation strategy’ in all member
states by 2005. Experiences from member states
such as Ireland, the UK and Holland, which had
already implemented similar measures at a
domestic level, have been introduced into subse-
quent pilot projects. Within the framework of a
joint initiative on regulatory reform, detailed
suggestions as to the development and implemen-
tation of assessment systems for determining the
consequences of regulatory proposals were made
(EU, 2004, 2005). The first pilot projects in 2003
were focused on quantifying cost elements
(VIBERT, 2004).
3. CBA in Financial Regulation Practice
Cost/benefit analyses such as these are a legal
requirement in many countries for new regulatory
Perspectives
FINANCIAL MARKETS AND PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT / Volume 19, 2005 / Number 3314
projects across a large number of regulatory areas
(INTERNATIONAL STUDY, 2003; RADAELLI,
2004; HAHN and LITAN, 2005). Yet while
systematic systems for determining the conse-
quences of regulatory proposals might already
be implemented in a number of areas, there are
still many countries where they are not imple-
mented for regulating financial markets. Even in
the European Union, cost/benefit analyses have
only been introduced systematically as an addi-
tional way of gathering information on the enact-
ment of regulations into a handful of countries so
far. And this despite the fact that such measures
are actually demanded as part of the ‘Better Regu-
lation’ system.
That being said, however, a large amount of expe-
rience has been made worldwide with different
models for determining the consequences of finan-
cial regulatory proposals. The UK is without doubt
a pioneer in this area. The Securities and Invest-
ment Board as far back as 1994 created an
institution for systematically carrying out cost/
benefit analyses for financial market regulation
projects, which were put under the organisational
control of the Financial Services Authority (FSA).
The Dutch Central Bank also published a model
with a strong focus on practical requirements,
which has been tried out in several individual
pilot projects over the past two years. Within the
framework of a large number of impact studies on
the effects of Basel II, cost/benefit-related effi-
ciency analyses have also been carried out in a
number of countries. Indeed, a number of different
commissions and working groups are currently
working on finding the answers to problems in this
area in Austria, Germany and Switzerland. The EU
itself has also repeatedly published efficiency
analyses on financial market regulations during the
recent past (BRABA¨NDER and FAHNENBRUCK,
2005).
In the US a system has been in place since the
early 1980s in which a repeatedly proven and
refined presidential decree issued in 1981 obliges
regulators to carry out an assessment of the con-
sequences of regulatory proposals and have this
assessment approved by the Presidential Office
of Management and Budget before they are per-
mitted to implement a ‘major rule’. As far as the
SEC (an independent authority that reports di-
rectly to congress) is concerned, however, these
decrees have no validity. Nevertheless, with the
Office of Economic Analysis, the SEC has created
an authority that deals with determining the
potential effect of regulatory measures on the
competitive situation in financial markets and
financial institutions, on the one hand, and smaller
and medium-sized companies on the other. Yet for
all this, only a few of the regulations enacted each
year are actually subjected to a systematic assess-
ment of the consequences. Take the five regulatory
impact analyses published by the SEC in 2003 for
example. While four did manage to quantify the
costs, it was only in a monetary form vis-a`-vis the
expected benefits (OBM, 2004).
The Australian financial market regulation system
also has a systematic impact analysis procedure in
place that is based on a cost/benefit model. Since
1997, all governmental institutions have been re-
quired to follow the Regulatory Impact Statement
Model, developed jointly by the Office of Regu-
lation Review and the Council of Australian Gov-
ernment. This is particularly true for the different
institutions involved in regulating the financial
markets. In addition to this, because of the public
importance of the financial sector, all existing
legal requirements also have to be subjected to a
systematic cost/benefit analysis at least once
every ten years (PRODUCTIVITY COMMIS-
SION, 2003; COAG, 2004). New Zealand uses a
similar model. In Canada, the Ontario Securities
Commission was responsible for the first regu-
latory impact analysis trials in 2002; in its final
report at the end of 2003 the so-called Regulatory
Burden Task Force called for the implementation
of systematic regulatory impact analyses for future
proposals for regulating the financial markets
(REGULATORY BURDEN TASK FORCE,
2003).
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4. Elements of a Simple CBA Model
While there might be several differences from
country to country, all the cost/benefit analysis
models are structured in a similar way. A simple
balance system is used which sets out to record the
costs and benefits of regulatory intervention in a
financial market and compare them against each
other. Depending on which model is being used,
individual factors are quantified and evaluated
based on monetary values.
If we accept, as already mentioned, that we are
dealing with a simple set of three objectives vis-a`-
vis regulation of the financial markets which enjoys
a large degree of consent in both theory and
practice and which sets out to, one, maximize the
resulting impact of the regulation and, two, define
system stability, system efficiency and stakeholder
protection variables that are influenced by the
regulation, we can base a cost/benefit model on
the following target functions (BERNET, 2005):
WREG¼ f SSYS; ESYS; Gð Þ ! opt!
where
WREG: Defines the efficiency of the regulation as a
net benefit value of the regulation as a
whole or as an isolated regulatory dec-
ision.
SSYS: Definedassystemstability,whichfor instance
can be expressed as the likelihood of a system
crisis. It is influenced by exogenous factors
(i.e., shock effects, loss of reputation) and
endogenous factors (i.e. solvency of market
participants), which, in turn, have a direct or
indirect impact on the regulation.
ESYS: Defined as system efficiency, which mea-
sures the allocation efficiency reached
in the system while taking into account the
resources and risk-allocation transaction
costs (meaning the search, evaluation, con-
tracting, transaction, monitoring and rene-
gotiation or sanctioning costs). The
individual benefits of a market participant
resulting from the regulation also need to
be allocated to this variable.
G: Defined as the degree of stakeholder pro-
tection achieved, which might be expressed
for example by the likelihood of a bank
default and the expected level of losses
vis-a`-vis the weighted risk exposure of the
financial institute’s own and borrowed
funds financiers.
It becomes immediately clear that while on the
one hand the three determining factors for regu-
lation efficiency mutually strengthen each other
(such as when higher system efficiency increases
the stability of the system), they can also find
themselves in a conflicting relationship to each
other (such as when higher system stability ac-
hieved through strengthened regulation increases
transaction costs and reduces system efficiency).
From a normative regulatory justification per-
spective, DWREG is used to demonstrate the
change in the likelihood of and the effect of a
market failure; advocates of positive regulatory
theories would be more likely to interpret this
value as a change in the economic, social or po-
litical position of stakeholders in the financial
intermediation system.
As far as simple cost/benefit models are con-
cerned, the presumption is that only regulatory
measures with a positive net effect should be im-
plemented. Net effect is taken to mean the dif-
ference between the sum of the weighted benefits,
that is, the cost effects of each measure (or the
entire regulatory regime). This allows one to ex-
press the fundamental principle of a cost/benefit
analysis in the following, albeit extremely simpli-
fied, equation:
WREG¼
z n m
@ @ @
s¼ 1 i¼ 1 j¼ 1
1 sij " sij NsijKsij
 
1þ rsij
 i
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where
WREG: The efficiency of the regulation defined as
a nets benefit value of the regulation as a
whole or as an isolated regulatory decision.
N,K: Evaluated benefit and cost effect (expressed,
for instance, in monetary units or by using
index values)
i : Year
j : Benefit or type of costs
r : Discount factor
s : Stakeholder category
l : Weighting factor, which is used to express
the political normative components in the
weighting of the net benefits
b : Factor, which is used for letting the com-
munication and perception aspects with re-
gard to the competitive situation between
different interest groups and pressure groups
flow into the weighting of net benefit.
5. Critical Perspective
Cost/benefit analysis methods are used in a large
number of countries for helping to resolve a wide
range of questions and have a long microeconomic
and economic tradition. Above all, they are used for
assessing the merits of environmental policy,
traffic policy and health policy decisions and mea-
sures, as well as for assessing regulation in the
pharmaceutical, chemical and health industries
(SUNSTEIN, 2002). Ultimately, the aim is to
scrutinize objectively normative decisions—a de-
sire that is almost unavoidably problematic in some
areas. It is set against this background that it is
hardly surprising that advocates and opponents of
such methods have been involved in long running
arguments as to the pros and cons, that is, the
possibilities and limits of such methods (see
BROMLEY, 1990; HAHN, 2005; Sen, 2005).
In contrast to the areas of regulation mentioned
above, which are primarily concerned with pro-
tecting human life, regulation of the financial
markets is concerned with other objectives. To
this end, then, the assessment criterion for evalu-
ating the cost and benefits of an isolated regula-
tory measure or for assessing the economic impact
of a regulation regime can change. Many of the
academic and practice-related articles, regardless
of whether they are for or against the systematic
implementation of cost/benefit analyses, cannot be
transferred to the regulation of financial markets
or can only be done so to a limited degree. Here
too, however, several central points of criticism
need to be taken into consideration for the
continuing discussions in this area:
 Normative basis: Every cost/benefit analysis is
based on an existing system of values that is
mostly implicit. Analyses are based on the as-
sumption that a decision is right when its bene-
fits are greater than the costs caused by the
decision. Questions concerning the definition of
benefit and cost values or evaluating the way in
which they are distributed between the stake-
holders are usually put to one side. Other benefit
categories such as trust and security are just as
difficult and almost impossible to measure. So,
too, intrinsic values such as freedom of choice,
competition and efficiency, which represent
core variables in the objective function of finan-
cial market regulation.
 Teleological orientation: Cost/benefit analyses
are geared towards effects, which they then
attempt to assess (SEN, 2000). This is justified
in the majority of cases. But how does one as-
sess deontological-orientated regulations such
as money laundering legislation or the regula-
tory measures for protecting money belonging
to politically exposed persons and institutions?
While it is, of course, possible to derive positive
effects for the reputation and therefore for the
stability of a financial intermediation system, this
does not alter the fact that the starting point for
regulation is based on a normative decision which
assumes that certain behaviour patterns will be
assessed as right and good, others as wrong and
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bad. As far as this assessment is concerned, it is a
function of the cultural environment in which it
takes place. In addition to this, it can change with
time.
 Completeness: The balancing methods on
which most cost/benefit models are based as-
sume that all benefit and cost elements can be
determined and their effects evaluated. The
ability to measure the aspects of the system that
are connected (including those that go beyond
the financial intermediation system that is
directly affected), however, would appear to be
very difficult in exactly the same way as it would
be to measure the benefit and cost-related
consequences. And because different consequen-
ces are often possible, a number of impact
scenarios could be envisaged, which, in a perfect
world, should also be integrated into any impact
analysis being carried out. Yet by estimating the
likelihood of any one scenario actually taking
place, one’s integrating again subjective elements
into the cost/benefit model.
 Methodical aspects: It is also important to take
a critical look at the way in which cost/benefit
models are implemented in financial markets
from a methodical perspective. This begins with
‘additive accounting’ on which the models are
founded. To make things simple, the cost and
benefit effects are added up. One side is allo-
cated a positive prefix, the other a negative.
Given that it is almost impossible to depict
linearly the indifference curves that result from
the cost/benefit relationships and that represent
economic entities or an entire finance system,
these also have to be put to one side in the name
of reducing complexity. Another weighty point
of criticism is the assumption of intertemporal
model-factor consistency. For example, it is
possible for priorities to change over time, par-
ticularly when the amount of information avail-
able on the implications to be expected increases.
Another controversial aspect is the discounting of
benefit and cost effects. In addition to the points
of criticism inherent to all such models, further
considerations also have to be incorporated into
the calculations of regulatory impact estimates.
While the cost of implementing a new regulatory
framework is usually immediate, a certain period
of time often has to pass before the associated
benefits of such changes can be measured.
Discounting these aspects leads to a systematic
preponderance of the cost effects. The question
as to how to incorporate cost and benefit effects
that have been postponed until a later point in
time into the considerations is another problem
that remains unresolved.
 Willingness to pay as a value: The practice of
carrying out monetary assessments, particularly
with regard to benefit effects, by using willing-
ness to pay of those being regulated as a value is
something that both the methodical and the
normative aspect have in common. The balanc-
ing method implicitly asks what people would
be prepared to pay as a maximum value for a
particular benefit. Here again, it would hardly
possible to depict, for instance, different indif-
ference curves for larger or smaller banks. Then
there is the question as to how to assess a public
good, the benefit of which cannot necessarily
be given as the sum of the individual effect.
And how does one incorporate distribution as-
pects or differences in the perception of risk or
the degree to which stakeholders in a finance
intermediation system are inclined to take risks
into the assessment?
It is these (and a large number of other) points of
criticism that have so far made legislators and
regulatory authorities hesitant to implement sys-
tematically cost/benefit analyses for new regula-
tory decrees. And this despite the fact that the
parties directly affected by new regulations have
been increasingly calling for such a system to be
implemented. Yet for all the criticism, it is im-
portant to recognize that analysing the economic
impact of regulation in financial markets can
also bring great benefits, provided they are im-
plemented correctly.
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6. Scorecard Models for Analysing
the Economic Impact of Regulation
The most important positive aspect here is the
sensitization of both the regulatory authorities and
those being regulated to the cost and benefit ef-
fects of the decision being made. Even if it has
to be accepted that it will never be possible to
evaluate fairly and take into account all the ef-
fects possible, attempting to introduce a system-
atic model and discussing critically the possible
effects of the regulation nevertheless contributes
to raising the awareness of all stakeholders. In
addition to this, experience from other areas of
regulation demonstrates that obliging regulators
to produce a cost/benefit analysis, regardless of
how it is structured, leads to a situation in which
both science and practice begin to address the
methodical and conceptual issues more closely.
This, in turn, leads to positive approaches for re-
ducing the points of criticism mentioned above.
At the same time both regulators and the regu-
lated are forced into providing more far-reaching
justifications for their decisions or objections.
The core problem of the current discussions con-
cerning the analysis of regulation effects lies in
the analysis’s one-sided focus models that are
rooted in traditional investment analysis methods.
These approaches can not satisfactory do justice
to the complexity involved in assessing public
goods neither in normative nor methodical terms.
Indeed, this has already been picked up on by a
large number of critics, who regard cost/benefit
analyses more as an approach than a specific
method (SEN, 2000). Thoughts along the same
lines have been taking place for a number of years
in connection with the conceptual orientation of
strategic controlling or measuring the performance
of strategic decisions. Here, too, it’s about find-
ing a way to record and assess the performance
of a decision in a multidimensional manner. In
a way that incorporates and attaches just as
much importance to qualitative elements as it does
quantitative elements. And it is set against this
background that a series of so-called scorecard
models were developed with the aim of un-
derstanding the performance of a decision from
different perspectives and while taking into account
different quantitative and qualitative criterion
(MU¨LLER-STEWENS and LECHNER, 2005).
Astonishingly, this kind of approach has not been
taken up into the methodical discussions on eco-
nomic regulatory impact assessment systems.
Take the Balance Scorecard approach developed
by KAPLAN and NORTON (1997) at the begin-
ning of the 1990s which has since been expanded
and implemented on a worldwide scale for ex-
ample. This system offers a large number of ap-
proaches for developing and expanding the scope
of traditional cost/benefit analyses for finance
market regulation (ROOST, 2005). Because both
here and in strategic terms it all boils down to
assessing over the long term the decisions that
restrict the room for manoeuvre for institutions
drawing on an objective function that includes
quantitative and qualitative aspects. A Balanced
Scorecard system of this kind could, for example,
depict the following regulatory impact analysis
aspects:
 As far as the system dimension is concerned, it
would enable analysis of the effects on system
stability, system efficiency, stakeholder protec-
tion, of the structure of the finance intermedi-
ation system and of its development and growth
etc.
 The process dimension would bring together
process-cost-related effect analyses (on a full
or marginal cost basis) with the complexity of
control processes caused by regulation or com-
pliance structures etc.
 The market dimension, for example, encom-
passes competitive structure, competitive inten-
sity, the volume developments of products sold
and product differentiation.
 And finally, the value dimension analyses the
degree to which regulatory decisions actually
meet the goals set out for them with regards
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to the normative framework of a finance inter-
mediation system and its stakeholders. This
can also encompass analysis of the effects of
regulatory decisions on the risk perception or
risk inclination of those participating in the
market.
This list, of course, is only intended as an illus-
tration. Nevertheless, constructing a model based
on the Balanced Scorecard method makes it pos-
sible to implement very different methods and
procedures with both a quantitative and qualitative
analysis focus in an accumulated way. More work
is need in this area before a more detailed pre-
sentation of such a scorecard model can be pre-
sented. Nonetheless, it is already clear that a model
of this kind would be able to ease the many points
of justifiable criticism associated with traditional
cost/benefit models used for regulatory impact
analysis purposes, as well as making it possible to
make better use of advantages offered from sys-
tematically analysing the effect of regulation from
an economic perspective.
7. Implications for Financial Market
Regulation
Nobody believes today that financial markets
would function efficiently without regulation.
With perhaps the exception of a few certain areas
such the hedge fund market and other markets for
specific contract types, hardly any proponents of
free banking remain in today’s global economy.
Financial market regulation focused on the three
regulatory objective function elements mentioned
at the beginning of this paper is required to es-
tablish the kind of competition needed to make
sure that financial markets can fulfil their alloca-
tion function at a satisfactory level of efficiency.
At the same time, however, it is also a possible
(although unintentional) effect for regulation to
limit this competition substantially and, in turn, to
reduce the efficiency of the market to an undesir-
able degree. How and where regulatory interven-
tion in financial markets should take place will
remain a controversial issue. Assessing the effects
of regulation will remain a function based on the
normative determinants of the assessors. Cost/
benefit analyses cannot resolve this problem. They
do, however, contribute towards increasing the
transparency of regulatory processes, demonstrat-
ing the way in which effects are connected in a
system context and making people aware of the
methodical and technical aspects involved in
evaluating cost and benefit effects. They force
legislators and regulators into providing a justifi-
cation for additional measures. They can also play
an important role in helping those being regulated
to recognize certain aspects.
The model criticisms mentioned with regard to other
regulatory areas should be taken seriously. Even if
these arguments cannot be rebutted, they do not
represent a fundamental argument against using
cost/benefit analyses for regulatory decisions. In-
stead they should be seen as a call for the search for
more suitable economic impact analysis models.
Indeed, for all the criticism they receive, analyses
of this kind remain the only way of arriving at
a reasonably objective discussion about the desir-
ability of regulatory measures or the efficiency of
existing regulatory regimes. The aim should be to a
make them part of all future consultation processes.
Set against this background, then, it is important that
the development, implementation and systematic
refinement of corresponding methods are promoted
and accelerated for financial market regulation.
Perspectives
FINANCIAL MARKETS AND PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT / Volume 19, 2005 / Number 3320
REFERENCES
BERNET, B. (2005): ‘‘Theoretische U¨berlegungen zur
Kosten-/Nutzenfunktion der Finanzmarktregulie-
rung’’; in: Bernet, B./Zwahlen, St.: Kosten-/Nutzena-
nalyse in der Finanzmarktregulierung; Bern 2005,
pp. 1–19.
BRABA¨NDER, B. and K. FAHNENBRUCK (2005):
‘‘Bessere Regulierung durch Folgenabscha¨tzung—
Chancen fu¨r mehr Wachstum in Europa’’, Die Bank
6/2005, pp.70–73.
BRENT, J. R. (1996): Applied Cost-Benefit Analysis,
Cheltenham/Brookfield.
BROMLEY, D. W. (1990): ‘‘The Ideology of Efficiency:
Searching for a Theory of Policy Analysis’’, Journal
of Environmental Economics and Management 19,
pp. 86–107.
BU¨HRER, C., I. HUBLI and E. MARTI (2005): ‘‘The
Regulatory Burden in the Swiss Wealth Manage-
ment Industry’’, Financial Markets and Portfolio
Management 19.1, pp. 99–108.
COAG (2004): Principles and Guidelines for National
Standard Setting and Regulatory Action by Minis-
terial Councils and Standard Setting Bodies; Concil
of Australian Governments, Canberra.
EUROPEAN UNION (2004): Commission report on
Impact Assessment: Next Steps; SEC (2004) 1377;
October 2004.
EUROPEAN UNION (2005): Better Regulation for
Growth and Jobs in the European Union; SEC 175;
March 2005.
GEIGER, H. and I. HUBLI (2004): ‘‘Kosten der
Bankenregulierung’’, Der Schweizer Treuha¨nder 8,
pp. 601–608.
HAHN, R. W. (2005): In Defence of the Economic
Analysis of Regulation; AEI Brokings Joint Center
for Regulatory Studies, Washington.
HAHN, R. W. and R. E. LITAN (2005): ‘‘Counting
Regulatory Benefits and Costs: Lessons for the
U.S. and Europe’’, Journal of International Econom-
ic Law 8(2), pp. 473–492.
HOFFMANN, S. (2004): ‘‘Standortbestimmung
Finanzmarktregulierung: Wie viel und welche Reg-
ulierung tut den Banken und dem Finanzplatz gut?’’,
Basel: Position Paper Swiss Bankers Association.
KAPLAN, R. and D. P. NORTON (1997): Balanced
Scorecard. Strategien erfolgreich umsetzen. Stuttgart.
LAYARD, R. and S. GLAISTER (1994): Cost-Benefit
Analysis, Cambridge.
LEVIN, H. M. and P. J. MCEWAN (2001): Cost-
Effectiveness Analysis; 2nd ed. London.
MU¨LLER-STEWENS, G. and C. LECHNER (2005):
Strategisches Management, 3rd ed.; Stuttgart.
OBM (2004): Informing Regulatory Decisions: 2004
Draft Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits
of Federal Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on
State, Local and Tribal Entities; Office of Manage-
ment and Budget, Washington, p. 22.
POSNER, E. A. (2001): Controlling Agencies with
Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Positive Political Theory
Perspective; University of Chicago Law Review 68,
p. 1137.
PRODUCTIVITY COMMISSION (2003): Regulation
and its Review 2002–03; Canberra.
RADAELLI, C. (2004): ‘‘The Diffusion of Regulatory
Impact Analysis: Best practice or Lesson Drawing’’,
European Journal of Political Research, pp. 725–749.
REGULATORY BURDEN TASK FORCE (2003):
Report to the Ontario Securities Commission;
Ontario, December.
ROOST, M. (2005): Wertorientierte Fu¨hrung im
Anlagefondsgescha¨ft auf der Grundlage des Kon-
zepts der Balanced Scorecard; Dissertation Uni-
versita¨t St.Gallen Nr. 2992, St. Gallen.
SEN, A. (2000): ‘‘The Discipline of Cost-Benefit
Analysis’’, The Journal of Legal Strudies XXIX(2)
June 2000, pp. 953–970.
SUNSTEIN, C. S. (2002): The Cost Benefit State:
The Future of Regulatory Protection, Chicago:
American Bar Association.
VIBERT, F. (2004): The EU’s New System of Regula-
tory Impact Assessment—A Scorecard; European
Policy Forum 2004, cited in Hahn/Litan, p. 493.
WILKE-SCHMIDT, J. (2004): Nutzenmessung im
Gesundheitswesen; Wiesbaden.
Perspectives
FINANCIAL MARKETS AND PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT / Volume 19, 2005 / Number 3 321
Beat Bernet is a full Professor
for Banking at the University of
St. Gallen and managing di-
rector of the Swiss Institute of
Banking and Finance since
1996. From 1999 to 2001 he
served as dean of the Busi-
ness Administration faculty of the University.
He is a board member of various banks and
financial institutions. Professor Bernet grad-
uated from the University of Zurich where he
also received his Doctoral Degree in Economics.
Previously, Professor Bernet was affiliated with
Arthur Andersen, Zurich, and with Bank Vonto-
bel, Zurich, where he served as an assistant to
the executive board. In 1983, he founded his
own banking consulting company, Bernet &
Parnter, Zug. His research areas are Transfor-
mation in Banking, Banking Strategy and Bank
Technology.
Perspectives
FINANCIAL MARKETS AND PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT / Volume 19, 2005 / Number 3322
